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Abstract
We analyze ecosystem management under unmeasurableKnightian uncer-
tainty or ambiguity which, given the uncertainties characterizing ecosystems,
might be a more appropriate framework relative to the classic risk case (mea-
surable uncertainty). This approach is used as a formal way of modelling the
precautionary principle in the context of least favorable priors and maxmin
criteria. We provide biodiversity management rules which incorporate the
precautionary principle. These rules take the form of either minimum safety
standards or optimal harvesting under precautionary approaches.
Keywords: Knightian uncertainty, uncertainty aversion, ambiguity aver-
sion, risk aversion, precautionary principle, biodiversity, optimal harvesting,
robust control.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Biodiversity loss has emerged as a major issue on both academic and policy
grounds. As stated in the recent Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report
(MEA 2005a, page 4):
Humans are fundamentally, and to a signicant extent irreversibly,
changing the diversity of life on earth, and most of these changes
represent a loss of biodiversity.
It is estimated, in the same report, that during the past several hundred
years, humans have increased the species extinction rate by as much as 1000
times over background rates over the planets history. In the MEA report
(2005b), it is acknowledged that ecosystem management practices that main-
tain diversity, functional groups, and trophic levels are more likely to decrease
the risk of large losses of ecosystem services than practices that ignore these
factors.
These statements suggest that the development of management rules that
could help to prevent loss of biodiversity is a desirable goal. The attain-
ment of this goal is hindered, however, both by the complexity of ecosystems
and by important and interrelated uncertainties, a number of which include
sources such as major gaps in global and national monitoring systems; the
lack of a complete inventory of species and their actual distributions; limited
modelling capacity and lack of theories to anticipate thresholds; emergence
of surprises and unexpected consequences. These uncertainties may impede
adequate scientic understanding of the underlying ecosystem mechanisms
and the impacts of policies applied to ecosystems. For the purposes of our
analysis we will refer to the overall uncertainty associated with these sources
as scientic uncertainty.
One feature of the uncertainty structure described above is that it might be
di¢ cult or even impossible to associate probabilities with uncertain prospects
a¤ecting the ecosystem evolution. This is close to the concept of uncertainty
as introduced by Frank Knight (1921) to represent a situation where there
is ignorance, or not enough information, to assign probabilities to events.
Knight argued that uncertainty in this sense of unmeasurable uncertainty is
more common in economic decision making. Knightian uncertainty is con-
trasted to risk (measurable or probabilistic uncertainty) where probabilities
can be assigned to events and they are summarized by a subjective probability
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measure or a single Bayesian prior. Thus Knightian uncertainty or ambigu-
itycan be regarded as an appropriate framework for analyzing issues related
to scientic uncertainty in biodiversity management.1 This uncertainty con-
cept has been associated formally with the concept of multiple priors (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989), as well as with the concept of uncertainty or ambiguity
aversion which in general increases with an ignorance parameter (Chen and
Epstein, 2002).
In economics, decision making under risk implies expected utility max-
imization. Under Knightian uncertainty as described above, it was Wald
(1950) who suggested that a maxmin solution could be a reasonable solution
to a decision problem where an a priori probability distribution does not ex-
ist or is not well known to the researcher. One way to approach the maxmin
solution is to use the idea of least favorable prior (LFP)2 decision theory, as
developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which results in maxmin expected
utility theory and represents an axiomatic foundation of Walds criterion.
Decision theory based on the LFP can be associated with the concepts of
precautionary principle (PP), safety margin (SM), and safe minimum stan-
dards (SMS). The precautionary principle is an approach where actions are
taken to anticipate and avert serious or irreversible harm, such as for example
extinction of species for the case of biodiversity preservation, or prevention of
an irreversible climate change, in advance of or without a clear demonstration
that such action is necessary. Marchant (2003) states that he PP prescribes
how to bring scientic uncertainty into the decision-making processes by ex-
plicitly formalizing precaution and bringing it to the forefront of deliberations.
On the other hand the ideas of LFP or worst case scenario (WCS) and irre-
versible changes can be intuitively put together, since the emergence of a WCS
could lead to an irreversible change. Therefore a direct link can be made be-
tween LFP ideas and the PP. Scientic uncertainty or model uncertainty can
be manifested in multiple priors. The decision maker cannot choose among
them, but one or more of these priors, the LFP, leads to irreversible change.
To prevent the irreversible change, which is not clearly demonstrated since
the decision maker does not know that the LFP will prevail, a precaution-
ary approach should be taken, which implies that the decision rule should be
1 In a recent article Shaw and Woodward (2008) very clearly present the high relevance
of this analytical framework for environmental and resource economics.
2Given a set of prior probability distributions associated with the multiple priors frame-
work, the LFP is the one that corresponds to the least favorable outcomes. It can be
associated with the concept of the worst case scenario. Under Knightian uncertainty the
researcher cannot choose one prior to dene expected utility as is done under risk.
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based on LFP. Thus, the maxmin expected utility can be used as a conceptual
framework for designing management rules which adhere to the PP.
Closely related to the these concepts are the ideas of SM and SMS for
the preservation of biodiversity (e.g. Holt and Tisdell, 1993). Safety mar-
gins could be dened in terms of feasible variations for land allocations and
harvesting values so that, under uncertainty and ambiguity aversion, species
biomasses will not deviate more than a prespecied level from a desire steady
state. Further, SMS could be dened in terms of minimum viable populations
and minimum habitat requirements. Using the LFP and maxmin framework,
SM and SMS can be dened so that species extinction is prevented under
the least favorable situation associated with the uncertainties obscuring the
scientic understanding of the ecosystemsmechanisms. These policies can
be regarded as management which embodies some type of PP.
The purpose of this paper is to combine these concepts and provide man-
agement rules for preserving biodiversity under scientic uncertainty and am-
biguity aversion, which follow a precautionary principle. The precautionary
approach is formalized by using multiple priors and LFP ideas, and maxmin
decision rules, which lead both to SM or SMS and optimal management rules
that embody the PP. Furthermore, by comparing optimal management rules
which are obtained by assuming rst the traditional risk set up and second
ambiguity, it is possible to obtain some quantication of the implications of
the PP in terms of decision variables such as harvesting and land allocation
rules.
In the rest of the paper we present two approaches to biodiversity man-
agement under scientic uncertainty and ambiguity aversion in models of
multiple species. In the rst approach we apply the k -ignorance approach
for specifying the multiple priors model and we derive, in terms of a de-
scriptive non-optimizing model of species interactions, harvesting and land
allocation rules for species which are designed to provide safety standards in
the sense of either keeping the species populations in some relation to initial
values, given an exogenously determined desired steady state for biomasses,
or keeping the species biomasses above some minimum safety standard with
a given probability. In the second approach we apply robust control methods
to derive optimal harvesting rules under model uncertainty. By comparing
solutions under risk and under ambiguity we provide a measure of the impact
of adopting precautionary approaches in ecosystem management.
3
2 Modelling Model Uncertainty
Rational expectations models do not permit a self-contained analysis of model
uncertainty. Assuming that economic agents have concerns about model mis-
specication reopens fundamental issues expressed by Knight (1921), Savage
(1954) and Elsberg (1961), ideas which, by adopting rational expectations,
have been set aside from agentsbeliefs.
Knight was the rst who made the distinction between risky events for
which a true probability distribution can be specied and a worse type of
ignorance, where a unique probability measure is not available, that he called
uncertainty. Savage believed that as an aspect of rationality, personal prob-
abilities are correct. On the other hand Fellner (1961) and Elsberg (1961)
challenged Savages theory, on the basis of experimental evidence. Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), motivated by the Elsberg paradox, formulated, in
an atemporal setting, a set of appropriate axioms and incorporated the idea
of uncertainty or ambguity aversion into decision making. Dynamic models
in which agents are adverse to model ambiguity have been constructed by
Epstein and Wang (1994) and Chen and Epstein (2002).
In the recent literature we can distinguish two main, although interrelated,
approaches for dealing with ambiguity: the multi priors and the robust control
approaches.
2.1 Modelling Uncertainty Using Multiple Priors
Let the set of states of the world be 
 and consider an individual observ-
ing some realization !t 2 
: The basic idea underlying the multiple priors
approach is that beliefs about the evolution of the process f!tg cannot be
represented by a probability measure. Instead, beliefs conditional on !t are
too vague to be represented by such a single probability measure and are rep-
resented by a set of probability measures (Epstein and Wang, 1994). Thus
for each ! 2 
, we consider P (!) as a set of probability measures about the
next periods state. Formally P is a correspondence P : 
!M (
) assumed
to be continuous, compact-valued and convex-valued andM (
) is the space
of all Borel probability measures.
The individual ranks uncertain prospects or acts which are denoted by :
Let u be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The utility of any act
 in an atemporal model is dened (Gilboa and Schmedler, 1989; Chen and
Epstein, 2002) as
U () = min
Q2P
Z
u () dQ (1)
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In a continuous time framework, recursive multiple prior utility, in a nite
time setting, is dened as:
Vt = min
Q2P
EQ
Z T
t
e (s t)u () ds

(2)
where the subjective set of priors P on a space (
;F) is uniformly absolutely
continuous with respect to QP:3,4
These denitions of utility in the context of multiple-priors correspond
to an intuitive idea of the worst case. Utility is associated with the util-
ity corresponding to the least favorable prior. With utility dened in this
way, decision making by using the maxmin rule follows naturally, since maxi-
mizing utility in the multiple-prior case implies maximizing the utility which
corresponds to the LFP.
The individuals set of priors can be further specied for the purposes
of the analysis by the so called k -ignorance approach. In this case the in-
dividual considers the reference probability measure P and another measure
Q 2 M (
) : The discrepancy between the two measures is dened by the
relative entropy
R(Q==P ) =
Z +1
0
e tEQ[
1
2
"2t ]dt (3)
where " is a measurable function associated with the distortion of the proba-
bility measure P to the probability measure Q. According to the k -ignorance
approach, the individual incorporates into her/his decision-making problem
the instantaneous relative entropy constraint Q() = fQ : EQ[12"2t ]   ; for
all tg; which means that probability measures di¤ering from the reference
measure P by at least as much as  should be taken into account. If Q
is a probability measure associated with the least favorable outcome, then
k -ignorance embodies an LFP or worst case scenario idea.5
2.2 Modelling Uncertainty Using Robust Control Methods
Another way to embody decisions makersconcerns about model misspecica-
tion is to use robust dynamic control, which is also a minmax approach which
3Uniformly absolutely continuous means that for every " > 0 there is  > 0 such that
E 2 F and Q(E) <  implies that P (E) < " 8P"P.
4For further details and behavioral implications of the structure of P see (Epstein and
Wang, 1995, Chen and Epstein 2002).
5Another way to specify the set of priors is the so called e-contamination approach
(Epstein and wang 1994), where the set of priors is a convex combination of the probability
measure P and the measure Q: Thus
P = f(1  )P + Q : Q 2M (
) ;  2 [0; 1]g
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has been introduced to economics by Hansen and Sargent (see for example
Hansen and Sargent (2001)). In this case the decision maker suspects that
his/her model is misspecied, in the sense that there is a group of approxi-
mate models which are also considered as possibly true given a set of nite
data. These approximate models are obtained by disturbing a benchmark
model, and the admissible disturbances reect the set of possible probability
measures that the decision maker is willing to consider, or otherwise how am-
biguous the decision maker is about the initial estimated model. The objective
of this approach is to choose by a minmax criterion, formulated in terms of
a di¤erential game where one agent is Naturethat choosesthe LFP, a rule
that will work well under a range of di¤erent model specications. The robust
control method which can be regarded as an approach for deriving optimal
dynamic policy rules under model uncertainty will be presented in more detail
in section 4.
In relation to biodiversity management the approaches described above
allow us to model the uncertainties or ambiguities underlying our scientic
knowledge about ecosystems in a way that, as will be shown later, leads to
well dened policy rules and allows for the quantication of the precautionary
principle.
3 Safety Standards and Biodiversity Management: A Non-
optimizing Approach
Economists usually try to manage ecosystems and biodiversity in an optimal
way despite the fact that the complexity of ecosystems might make optimiza-
tion exercises di¢ cult, even at a theoretical level. On the other hand, if we
are interested in preserving diversity it might be useful to think about man-
aging ecosystems using safety rules, which when applied prevent species or
a set of species from becoming extinct.6 Safety rules in biodiversity preser-
vation could acquire greater importance when the ecosystem manager faces
Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity which, as discussed above, is a poten-
tially very relevant case in ecosystem management. In this situation worst
case events might cause surprises and extinction of species. Since these ir-
reversible changes have occurred in reality, dealing with worst case scenarios
means that ecosystem management and biodiversity preservation are asso-
6Safety regulation is a more general issue in economics. For a general discussion of the
role of economic analysis in the development of environmental health and safety regulation,
see Arrow et al. (1996). For a discussion of safety standards in species protection, see for
example Holt and Tisdell (1993).
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ciated with a PP, which implies that the management rules are such that
species will not become extinct under worst case scenarios.
3.1 Safety Standards in a Deterministic Model
We examine rst the determination of safe minimum standards for preventing
biodiversity loss, in terms of minimum population levels in the context of a
deterministic model. The deterministic model developed here is used as a
vehicle for the introduction of uncertainty in analyzing biodiversity manage-
ment, which is the main target of this paper. In this model population levels
are directly controlled by harvesting, and available habitat for each species
which is determined by land allocations rules.
We start by considering an ecosystem manager who manages a landscape,
normalized to unity, where two species coexist. Let Bit for i = 1; 2 be
the biomasses of the two interacting species at time t; where b12; b21 are the
interaction coe¢ cients between them. It is assumed that the evolution of the
initial biomasses (B10;B20) through time can be described by the system of
deterministic di¤erential equations:
_B1=B1f1(w)[1  h1  B1w   b12B2w] (4)
_B2=B2f2(1  w)[1  h2  B2(1  w)  b21B1(1  w)]
where hi = di+ h^i, hi denotes the total removal rate from biomass, h^i denotes
net harvesting, and di are the death rates, for i = 1; 2: Since the death rates
are assumed known and xed choosing hi is equivalent to choosing h^i; thus we
use hi as our control variable. Furthermore fi are the intrinsic growth rates
with (w; 1  w) being a land allocation rule. It is assumed that the intrinsic
growth rate which depends on w or 1   w is increasing and concave in the
land allocated to the species with fi (0) = 0.
Using a non-dimensionalization, which is usually applied to models of
interacting populations, the model above can be rewritten in a simplied
form as:
_u1= u1(1  u1   a12u2   h1) = g1 (u1; u2;h1; h2) (5)
_u2= u2f^(w)(1  u2   a21u1   h2) = g2u1; u2;h1; h2; f^ (w))
f^ (w) =
f2(1  w)
f1(w)
; a12 = b12
w
1  w; a21 = b21
1  w
w
; u1 = B1w; u2 = B2(1  w)
In this model carrying capacity is proportional to 1=w or 1= (1  w) for a
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space normalized to one.
For a12a21 1 6= 0 the dynamical system (5) has four steady states dened
for _u1 = _u2 = 0. In three of them either both or one of the species biomasses
are zero. Since we are interested in the preservation of both species we will
focus on the fourth steady state where both biomasses are positive and thus
both species are preserved in long-run equilibrium. The species biomasses in
this steady state are:
u1=
1
a12a21   1 (h1 + a12   h2a12   1) (6)
u2=
1
a12a21   1 (h2 + a21   h1a21   1) :
It follows that a desired steady state u = (u1; u2) dened through (6) can be
attained if there exist non-negative xed harvesting rules (h1; h2) = h which
solve the linear system (6) for the given u = (u1; u2) : The stability properties
of the desired steady state are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that the non-negative harvesting rule (h1; h2) = h
attains the desired steady state u = (u1; u2) : Then if
(i)
1  h1   a12 + h2a12 + f^(w)(1  h2   a21 + h1a21)
a12a21   1 < 0:
(ii) (1  h1   a12 + h2a12)(1  h2   a21 + h1a21)
 ( h1a12   a212 + h2a212 + a12)( h2a21   a221 + h1a212 + a21)> 0:
The desired steady state is stable and can be reached from any initial bio-
mass levels in its neighborhood.
Proof. The proof follows directly for the Jacobian of the dynamical system
(5) evaluated at the desired steady state. The Jacobian is
J (u1; u

2) =
"
1 h1 a12+h2a12
a12a21 1
 h1a12 a212+h2a212+a12
a12a21 1
f^(w)
 h2a21 a221+h1a212+a21
a12a21 1 f^(w)
1 h2 a21+h1a21
a12a21 1
#
Condition (i) implies negative trace, while condition (ii) implies positive de-
terminant. Therefore the Jacobian matrix has eigenvalues with negative real
parts and the desired steady state is stable.
At this stage the desired steady state is rather loosely determined, with-
out any reference to optimality criteria. It can be assumed, however, that
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this steady state is determined through some political process, which is a sit-
uation very often encountered in reality, where competing conservation and
harvesting objectives determine some equilibrium desired steady state. The
process of arriving at this steady state is not modelled here.
3.2 Safety Standards in Stochastic Environments
3.2.1 Safety Standards under Risk Aversion
Having dened the desired deterministic state as a benchmark we consider,
in this section, the more realistic case where the evolution of biomasses is
stochastic. We assume at this stage that the manager of the ecosystem has
a single subjective prior distribution. A single prior is the main character-
istic of the vast majority of continuous time dynamic models which assume
probabilistic sophistication, implying that we analyze the problem under risk
(measurable uncertainty). We follow this approach because it is an intuitive
way to proceed to the case of Knightian (unmeasurable) uncertainty, but also
because it allows us, by comparing solutions under risk and solutions under
uncertainty, to obtain a quantication of the precautionary principle, since
as discussed in the introduction, PP can be associated with the Knightian
uncertainty framework.
Keeping that same structure with the deterministic model, we assume
that the evolution of the initial biomasses B10;B20 through time is given by a
system of stochastic di¤erential equations, which in the nondimensionalized
form can be written as:
du1= u1 (1  u1   a12u2   h1) dt+ 1(h; u1)dz1 (7)
du2= f^ (w)u2 (1  u2   a21u1   h2) dt+ 2(h; u2)dz2
where dz1; dz2 denote two correlated Brownian motions, with  being the
correlation coe¢ cient between them.7
To obtain a better understanding of the problem, we analyze a rst or-
der linear approximation (see Flemming, 1971) of the stochastic di¤erential
equations (7) in the neighborhood of the desired deterministic steady state
(u1; u2), (h1; h2).
7For an appropriate specication of the dynamics of the uncontrolled system, the two
biomasses should not take negative values, which means that i (h; 0) = 0 for i = 1; 2.
Alternatively if the variances are independent of u; it can be assumed that the ui represents
logarithms of the nondimensionalized biomasses so that they follow a lognormal distribution.
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Let (ui   ui ) = xi; dui = dxi; (1  2u1   a12u2   h1) = 11; a12u1 =
12; f^ (w) a21u2 = 21; f^ (w) (1  2u2   a21u1   h2) = 22; where ij ; i; j =
1; 2 depend on the harvesting and the land allocation parameters at the de-
sired deterministic steady state. Using matrix notation, the rst-order linear
approximation of the stochastic di¤erential equations (7) in the neighborhood
of the desired deterministic steady state can be written as:
dx=Axdt+dz where (8)
dx=
"
dx1
dx2
#
; A =
"
11 12
21 22
#
; =
"
1 0
0 2
#
; dz =
"
dz1
dz2
#
:
The following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 2 Given a land allocation rule and a harvesting rule (w; h1; h2)
and initial values (x10; x20) ; the expected values of the two biomasses are given
by
Ex1t=A1tx10 +A2tx20 (9)
Ex2t=A3tx10 +A4tx20:
Proof. System (8), multiplied from the left by a suitable matrix, becomes
(see Oksendal (2000)): 8
d(e Atxt) = e Atdx  e AtAxdt = e Atdz (10)
where eF =
1X
n=1
1
n!
Fn = F +
1
2!
F 2 +
1
3!
F 3 + ::::: (11)
where F = At: (12)
Equivalently:
e Atxt   x0 =
Z t
0
e Asdzs (13)
xt = e
Atx0 +
Z t
0
eA(t s)dzs ; x0 =
"
x10
x20
#
(14)
8 In our case F is the matrix  At: The elements of this matrix converge to a real
number. This holds because each element of this matrix is upper bounded by the sum
aq =
P1
q=1
2q 1
q!
( tx)q; with x being the maximum of the four elements of matrix A in equa-
tion (8). For the above general term a known convergence criterion holds: lim sup jaq+1
aq
j < 1
and therefore the series converge.
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where
eAt =
"
A1 A2
A3 A4
#
(15)
with Ai for i = 1; :::; 4 depending on the values of the interaction coe¢ cients
aij and on fi, hi: The Ai can be calculated using relationship (11): Using
relationships (13) and (15), we can derive:
x1t=A1tx10 +A2tx20 +
Z t
0
G1dz1 +
Z t
0
G2dz2 (16)
x2t=A3tx10 +A4tx20 +
Z t
0
G3dz1 +
Z t
0
G4dz2 (17)
with Gi being functions of fi , hi; and i; with the property that they belong
to the class V = V (0; T ):9 The four integrals in equations (16) and (17) are
stochastic integrals with the property that for all the possible combinations of
i; j;
E
Z t
0
Gidzj = 0: (18)
Therefore taking expected values in (16) and (17), condition is (9) ob-
tained.
In expressions (9), Ait is dened as Ait = Ai(w; h1; h2; t) and thus the
associated expected deviations from the desired steady state depend on the
land allocation weights (w; 1  w) and on the harvesting rules (h1; h2). Since
Exit = E (uit   ui ) = Euit   ui ; (9) can be written as:
Eu1t=A1(w; h1; h2; t) (u10   u1) +A2(w; h1; h2; t) (u20   u2) + u1 (19)
Eu2t=A3(w; h1; h2; t) (u10   u1) +A4(w; h1; h2; t) (u20   u2) + u2
Suppose that for a given (u1; u2) the manager wants the expected biomasses
at time t to satisfy a certain exogenous safety standard by being a certain pro-
portion of initial biomasses, Euit = iui0. The land allocation and harvesting
rule (wt; h1t; h2t) that satises (19) for Euit = iui0, provided that it exists,10
9V is the set of measurable and adapted functions f with the property E R T
0
f(t; !)2dt <
1: Then for the corresponding stochastic integral it holds that E R T
0
f(t; !)dzt = 0:
10System (19) is a nonlinear system with two equations and three unknowns (w; h1; h2) :
Solution means that by xing one of the unknowns, say w; the other two will be determined
as functions hi = hi (w) : Thus for a given land allocation w, hi (w) is the harvesting rule
which satises the safety margin. A solution will exist if the Jacobian determinant of (19)
with respect to (h1; h2) does not vanish in an appropriate neighborhood which contains the
solution.
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can be regarded as a safety rule, which under conditions of risk prevents ex-
pected species biomasses from moving below the safety standard at time t:
If the safety standard is determined by a rule Euit = iuit 1, t = 1; 2; :::
then the sequence (wt+1; h1t+1; h2t+1); t = 0; 1; 2; ::: will determine an adap-
tive safety rule which will not let expected biomasses go below an exogenous
safety standard.
The multi-species case Our model can be extended to the multi-species
case. In this case, the evolution of the biomass of the kth species is given by:
duk = ukf^k(w)[1 hk ukwk 
X
j 6=k
bkjujwk]dt+kdzk , j; k = 1; ::::; n (20)
with w =(w1; :::; wn) ;
P
k wk = 1 being the land allocation rule and f^k(wk) =
fk(w)
f1(w)
. Following the same procedure as above, the expected values of species
biomasses are dened as:
Exkt =
nX
i=1
Atkixi0 ; k = 1; ::n: (21)
3.2.2 Safety Margins under Knightian Uncertainty and Precaution
Suppose now that the ecosystem manager operates under conditions of am-
biguity or Knightian uncertainty, which could be a realistic approximation
of the actual ecosystem conditions. Along the lines of our previous discus-
sion, this type of uncertainty can be modelled in terms of the multiple priors
approach. In particular, we assume that the manager has multiple priors re-
garding the evolution of the species biomasses. We further specify the set of
priors by following the k -ignorance approach.
For the two species case the ecosystems dynamics can now be written as:
dx=Axdt+Rdbz where (22)
dx=
"
dx1
dx2
#
; A =
"
11 12
21 22
#
; =
"
1 0
0 2
#
R=
"
1 0

p
1  2
#
; dz^ =
"
dbz1
dbz2
#
with all the variables dened as in (8),  being the correlation coe¢ cient
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between the two Brownian motions in the initial system (8), and dz^1; dz^2
being two independent Brownian motions.
In the k -ignorance approach, the landscape manager has reference priors
about the biomassesevolution, which are expressed by dzi: Because of ambi-
guity the manager considers a decision-making problem with multiple priors.
In this problem the prior, which according to the managers beliefs is further
away from the reference prior, does not di¤er from the reference prior, in
terms of relative entropy, more than a positive number. This means that the
manager is characterized by a subjective maximumlevel of ignorance, and
believes that all sources of uncertainty that make him/her ambiguous about
the reference model (or reference prior) cannot lead to a model that di¤ers
from the reference model by more that a certain level. To obtain the set of
priors which reect ambiguity, using as the benchmark model the model of
the reference priors (8), we consider measurable drift distortions to the refer-
ence priors. More specically the initial Brownian motions, dzi; i = 1; 2; of
the stochastic system (8) are replaced by
zi(t) = bzi(t) + Z t
0
"i(s)ds ; i = 1; 2 (23)
where bzi are Brownian motions and "i are measurable functions. By doing
this, system (22) takes the form:
dx = Axdt+REdt+Rdbz where E = ""1
"2
#
: (24)
Following the same approach as in the proof of proposition 1, the evolution
of species biomass under ambiguity (unmeasurable uncertainty) is given by:
xt = e
Atx0 +
Z t
0
eA(t s)REds+
Z t
0
eA(t s)Rdbzs: (25)
If we compare equation (25) with (13), it can be seen that the extra term,R t
0 e
A(t s)REds; acts as a measure of precaution and reects the impact of
Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, relative to the case of risk. This has as a
result the introduction of two extra terms in equations (16) and (17). There-
fore the expected values change depending on the structure of the problems
parameters.
In particular, when considering distortions in the benchmark model, the
initial measure P is replaced by another probability measure Q. The dis-
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crepancy between the two measures is measured by the relative entropy,
R(Q==P ) =
R +1
0 e
 tEQ[12"
2
t ]dt: According to the k -ignorance framework,
we consider the instantaneous relative entropy constraint11 Q() = fQ :
EQ[
1
2"
2
t ]   ; for all tg; which restricts the set of models the decision maker
considers at each instant of time. This constraint means that the deviation
between the reference prior and the distorted priors cannot be more than  i:12
Then, the worst case perturbation is:
"it =  
p
2 i: (26)
It should be clear that (26) reects the idea of the LFP with the multiple priors
model. By adopting this approach the distortions are now constant negative
numbers and therefore we can calculate the adjusted values. In particular, ex-
amining one of the possible cases of the signs of the matrix eA(t s)RE in the
integral
R t
0 e
A(t s)REds which reects the impact of Knightian uncertainty
on decision making, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 3 Given a land allocation rule and a harvesting rule (w; h1; h2);
the di¤erences in expected values of the biomasses of species i = 1; 2, under
ambiguity formalized in terms of k-ignorance, relative to the risk (measurable
uncertainty) case, are given by
R t
0 e
A(t s)REds:
Proof. Regarding the sign choice of the matrix eA(t s)RE we have that: 13
if eA(t s) =
"
+ 
 +
#
R =
"
1 0

p
1  2
#
; E =
"
 p21
 p22
#
RE =
"
 p21
 p21 
p
22
p
1  2
#
eA(t s)RE =
"
    (p21+
p
22
p
1  2)  ;  < 0
+   (p21+
p
22
p
1  2)+ ;+ > 0
#
: (27)
Therefore from equation (27) we obtain that if the term (
p
21+
p
22
p
1  2)
is less than or equal to zero, then the second element of the matrix is positive
11This is in contrast to the robust control approach where we consider a lifetime constraint.
12This  i reects the managers beliefs about ambiguity and model uncertainty. If  = 0
then the manager is risk averse in the traditional sense and believes that the reference prior
is an adequate representation of uncertainty.
13Depending on the values of the elements of matrix A, other possible cases can be
examined. For the specic case of choices of signs in Proposition 4, which turns out to
be the more interesting one, we provide numerical results.
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and the rst is negative. When 1 = k2 the above condition is satised ifp
k+
p
1  2 6 0 : Particularly if k = 1; the previous condition is satised
if  6  
p
2
2 :
Condition (27) implies that under ambiguity aversion and given land al-
location and harvesting rules, the path of the expected deviations from the
desired steady state changes relative to the risk aversion case. In particular,
when
p
21 +
p
22
p
1  2 6 0; the expected value that corresponds to
the rst species can be lower, and the expected values corresponding to the
second species can be higher as compared to the values obtained under risk
aversion. In general, however, the nal outcome depends on the type of corre-
lation between the two biomasses and the regulators beliefs about the worst
case scenario. This could be of interest since it implies that our approach of
dealing with ambiguity does not lead simply to wider values and uniformly
more conservative behavior regarding both species, but takes into account the
structure of the ecosystem and the relationship among species.
Further insights can be obtained by considering land allocation and har-
vesting rules which correspond to the same expected deviations for the bio-
masses under both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Consider a rule
(wr; hr1; h
r
2) under risk aversion (Proposition 2) and a rule (w
a; ha1; h
a
2) un-
der ambiguity aversion (Proposition 4) which both attain the same safety
standard for the same initial biomass values. Comparison of the rules could
provide some quantitative measure associated with precaution. In particular
deviations jwr   waj ; jhri   hai j i = 1; 2; would quantify the impact of being
precautious in terms of harvesting and land allocation. This is because they
represent the necessary changes in the harvesting and land allocation that will
preserve under a least favorable prior, the same amount of biomasses relative
to the risk aversion case, which is the case where the manager is condent
about the reference model.
3.3 Numerical Approximations
To obtain a better understanding of the structure of the solution of the above
problem some numerical results are provided.14 We assume that a suitable
xed land allocation rule w^ = (w^;1  w^) has been chosen such that f^(w) = 1
14The linearization which we adopt for our numerical simulations produces clearly inter-
pretable results, but it should be noticed that these results hold in a bounded time interval,
otherwise linearity might lead to unbounded solutions. Nevertheless even with this limita-
tion the linear approximation provides clear insights into the e¤ects of precaution. A full
scale empirical implementation with appropriate curvature assumptions is beyond the scope
of the present paper and represents an area for further research.
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and a21 = a12 = 0:7:15 For the harvesting rule at the deterministic case
we assume h1 = h2 = 0:5: This rule implies that the desired deterministic
steady state (DDSS) dened by (6) is u1 = u2 = 0:2941: This steady state is
stable since the trace of the associated Jacobian matrix is negative, while the
determinant is positive.
Table 1 below depicts the deviations of the expected values of the two
biomasses from the DDSS (0:2941; 0:2941) during three time periods, if har-
vesting of the species during these periods is kept at the level of (h1;h2) =
(0:5; 0:5):
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
x1 = u1   u1 0:4281 0:2597 0:1575
x2 = u2   u2 0:4281 0:2597 0:1575
Table 1: Deviations of expected values for the two biomasses as a function
of t; where h1 = h2 = 0:5; and
DDSS = (u1; u2) = (0:2941; 0:2941) ; a21 = a12 = 0:7; f^1(w) = 1:
Table 1 indicates that the expected values of the two biomasses in the
rst three periods are 0:4281 + 0:2941 = 0:7222; 0:2597 + 0:2941 = 0:5538;
and 0:1575 + 0:2941 = 0:4516; respectively. Expected biomasses decline as
they converge towards the DDSS according to the stability properties of this
steady state.
We turn now to the case of Knightian uncertainty and precaution. Cal-
culating the terms that correspond to the integral
R t
0 e
A(t s)REdt; we can
quantify the impact of precaution at the expected values of the two bio-
masses. We adopt the same parameter values as in table 1, that is f^(w) = 1;
a12 = a21 = 0:7. Furthermore, we assume that the standard deviation is
the same for the two biomasses, that is 1 = 2 = 0:1; that the correlation
coe¢ cient is  =
p
2=2; and that the parameter  i which reects managers
ambiguity and maximumignorance is equal to 0:15 for each one of the two
biomasses and each instant of time. Table 2 presents the changes in the devi-
ations of the expected values of the two biomasses under ambiguity, relative
to the traditional risk aversion case.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
change in x1  0:0412  0:0628  0:0728
change in x2  0:0629  0:1044  0:1326
15Matlab has been used for numerical calculations.
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Table 2: Changes in the expected values for the two biomasses due to
precaution as a function of t where, h1 = h2 = 0:5;  =
p
2=2;  i = 0:15;
i = 0:1; i = 1; 2.
Model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion induces a reduction in the ex-
pected values of the two biomasses relative to the risk aversion case. The
results of table 2 can be interpreted in the following way. If the manager is
ambiguity averse with ignorance parametrized by  i = 0:15 and follows the
harvesting rule h1 = h2 = 0:5; then in the rst period expected biomasses
will be 0:0412 and 0:0629 less than expected biomasses under risk for species
1 and 2 respectively. Thus taking into account that a worst case senario (or a
least favorable prior), which is parametrized by the value of  i; may emerge
because the manager is ambigous about his/her reference model, then the
expected values of biomasses are less relative to the case where the manager
is condent about the reference model and the worst case scenario is ruled
out. The biomass evolution for the rst three periods are shown in table 3.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Eu1 0:681 0:491 0:379
Eu2 0:6593 0:4494 0:319
Table 3: Expected values for the two biomasses under ambiguity aversion,
where h1 = h2 = 0:5;  =
p
2=2;  i = 0:15; i = 0:1; i = 1; 2.
The convergence to the DDSS is faster relative to the risk aversion case,
but eventually the expected biomasses will fall below the DDSS due to ambi-
guity. Thus under ambiguity aversion expected values tend to be less relative
to risk aversion for the same level of harvesting.
A plausible question emerging from this result is: how much should the
harvesting rule under ambiguity aversion change, relative to the risk aversion
rule, so that expected biomasses under risk and ambiguity aversion will be
the same? The di¤erence in harvesting between risk and ambiguity can be
regarded as a measure of precaution in the following sense. If, because of
ambiguity about the reference model, the manager is to take into account the
possible emergence of a worst case scenario, then in order to keep expected
biomasses at the the same level as if the reference model was known, harvest-
ing should be changed by a certain amount relative to the harvesting when
the reference scientic model is known. The necessary changes in harvest-
ing in order to keep the same expected biomasses under di¤erent uncertainty
structures, while land allocation is kept constant, are shown in table 4.
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t 1 2 3
change in h1  0:0679  0:1324  0:2637
change in h2  0:0727  0:1372  0:2747
u1 0:3275 0:3654 0:4341
u2 0:3435 0:3814 0:4708
Table 4: The impact of precaution in terms of harvesting and on steady
state, where  =
p
2=2;  i = 0:15; i = 0:1, i = 1; 2; h1 = h2 = 0:5; n = 2
Harvesting should be reduced in the rst period by  0:0679 and  0:0727
for species 1 and 2 respectively, when the manager operates under model un-
certainty and ambiguity aversion, so that expected values are the same as in
the case where the manager operates without model uncertainty and he/she
is just risk averse. In a sense these reductions can be regarded as reecting
the cost of been precautious, in terms of reduced harvesting, under model
uncertainty. Since however harvesting changes, the DDSS, which is also the
expected desired steady state (EDSS) for the biomasses which is implied by
the new harvesting rules, changes. The sequence of new expected DDSS is
shown in the two last rows of table 4. The results suggest that ambiguity
aversion implies an increase in expected steady state biomass values relative
to risk aversion. This can be regarded as the e¤ect of precaution. Since the
manager is ambiguous about the reference model, in order to take into ac-
count the emergence of a worst case scenario, harvesting should be reduced
and expected biomass values should be increased relative to the case where
scientic uncertainty does not exist. The specic structure of anbiguity im-
plied by the k -ignorance approach allows the quantication of the precaution
e¤ect in terms of harvesting.
By keeping all the parameter values as above except for the value of the
correlation coe¢ cient which we set at  =  p2=2; we repeat the calculations
leading to table 2. We present the new results in table 5 below.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
change in x1  0:0478  0:0848  0:1147
change in x2 0:0047 0:0156 0:0296
Table 5: Changes at the expected values for the two biomasses due to
precaution as a function of t; where h1 = h2 = 0:5;  =  
p
2=2;  i = 0:15;
i = 0:1; i = 1; 2
It can be seen that in this case precaution induces a reduction in the
expected values only for the rst biomass. For the second species there is an
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increase in the expected values. The impact of precaution, as dened in table
4, can be quantied in terms of harvesting units as shown in table 6 below.
t 1 2 3
change in h1  0:0326  0:0580  0:0944
change in h2  0:0237  0:0444  0:0732
u1 0:3255 0:3469 0:3787
u2 0:2958 0:3016 0:3081
Table 6: The impact of precaution in terms of harvesting, where
 =  p2=2;  i = 0:15; i = 0:1, i = 1; 2; h1 = h2 = 0:5
In table 6 both harvesting and the DDSS move towards the same direction
as in table 3, with the only di¤erence being the magnitude of the change.
The analysis above suggests that ambiguity aversion induces a di¤erent
EDSS than the one corresponding to risk aversion, which is in general higher.
Another way of approaching the problem is to keep the EDSS xed at the
original level of (u1; u2) = (0:2941; 0:2941), and calculate the changes in har-
vesting rates which under ambiguity aversion will provide the same expected
values as in the case of risk aversion.
Using the results of tables 1 and 2 we obtain table 7.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
change in h1  0:1259  0:1889  0:3443
change in h2  0:1337  0:2001  0:3630
Table 7: The impact of precaution in terms of harvesting, where  =
p
2=2;
 i = 0:15; i = 0:1, i = 1; 2; h1 = h2 = 0:5; n = 2:
Using the results of tables 1 and 5 we obtain table 8.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
change in h1  0:061  0:0844  0:1248
change in h2  0:043  0:0607  0:0928
Table 8: The impact of precaution in terms of harvesting,  =  p2=2;
 i = 0:15; i = 0:1, i = 1; 2; h1 = h2 = 0:5:
In order to explore the impact of the correlation coe¢ cient  we derive the
change in harvesting in order to keep constant the expected biomass values
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under di¤erent uncertainty structures. The results are shown in table 9, for
 =  0:9; 0:95; 0:99 and t = 1: Table 9 depicts, for one time period and
for various values of the corelation coe¢ cient the impact on harvesting rates
for keeping the same EDSS under ambiguity aversion as in the case of risk
aversion.
nt = 1 Changes in (h1; h2)
 0:9 ( 0:0410; 0:0150)
 0:95 ( 0:0336; 0:0047)
 0:99 ( 0:0248;+0:0076)
Table 9: The impact of precaution in terms of harvesting where,  i = 0:15;
i = 0:1, i = 1; 2; h1 = h2 = 0:5:
It can be noticed from the last row of table 9 ( =  0:99) that if the
manager wants to follow a precautionary principle and to keep the expected
requirement within the same values as in the risk aversion case under certain
values of our parameter space, harvesting should be reduced for the rst
species but increased for the second. Furthermore the associated steady state
could have lower biomass values than the values proposed under risk Thus
depending on the correlation among the two species biomasses, precaution
could imply conservative behavior towards one species and aggressive behavior
towards the other relative to risk aversion. It should be emphasized that this
conservative/aggressive behavior keeps the expected values within the same
levels as in the risk aversion case.
This result about conservative/aggressive behavior might be regarded as
counterintuitive, since one expects precaution to induce uniformly conserva-
tive behavior, as has been detected in the areas of monetary policy (Onatski
and Williams, 2003) and portfolio selection (Vardas and Xepapadeas, 2007).
In the case examined in the present paper it is the very strong negative corre-
lation coe¢ cient that allows behavior to be aggressive regarding one species,
since the emergence of a least favorable prior will move species biomasses in
di¤erent directions.
3.4 Probabilistic Safety Minimum Standards under Risk and
Uncertainty
Another way of approaching biodiversity management in terms of exogeneous
safety minimum standards is to ask the question: Under what harvesting and
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land allocation rules will species biomasses exceed a minimum level set exo-
geneously with a given probability? This rule is formulated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Given land allocation and harvesting rules (w1; :::; wn;h1; :::; hn);
upper and lower bounds can be determined for the probabilities that the bio-
masses of species i = 1; 2; :::; n are higher than 1 of the initial biomasses
values. The safety rules and the corresponding bounds are characterized by
(
Ak1
l1k
+Akk +
Akn
lnk
)  1

Pr(xkt > 1

xk0)  (Ak1
l1k
+Akk +
Akn
lnk
)
with ljk =
xk0
xj0
k = 1; :::n j 6= k: (28)
For n=2 species the above relationship takes the form
(A1 +
A2
l
)  1

Pr(x1t > 1

x10)  
x10
(A1x10 +A2x20)
= (A1 +
A2
l
) (29)
(lA3 +A4)  1

Pr(x2t > 1

x20)  
x20
(A3x10 +A4x20)
= (lA3 +A4) (30)
where l=
x10
x20
:
Proof. Proofs follow directly from (8), using standard operations from prob-
ability theory.
In expressions (29) and (30), Ai is dened as Ai = Ai(w; h1; h2; t) and
thus the associated probability bounds depend on the land allocation weights
(w; 1  w) and on the harvesting rules (h1; h2). The land allocation and har-
vesting rule (w; h1; h2) that satises proposition 4 therefore provides a proba-
bilistic safety rule, since it bounds the probability of having the biomasses at
any point in time above the level 1xi0; i = 1; 2. By choosing this level, that is
by choosing 1=; relations (29) and (30) can be used to determine a land al-
location and a harvesting rule (w; h1; h2) for desired probability bounds. For
example, a rule (w; h1; h2)jxp could be specied such that the biomasses during
the planning period exceed by x% the initial biomasses, with a probability
that is between p and p + p: Thus x% can be regarded as a probabilistic
SMS for keeping species from extinction with probability p: Then the rule
(w; h1; h2)jxp can be regarded as a probabilistic safety rule which may prevent
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the loss of biodiversity or the irreversible extinction of a species with a given
probability.
A proposition similar to 4 can also be derived under model uncertainty
and ambiguity aversion. The basic result is that to keep the same probabilitic
SMS between risk and ambiguity aversion, harvesting in general should be
reduced when model uncertainty exists. As indicated however by numerical
results, there exist parameter constellations such that, when a strong nega-
tive correlation among species exists, the combined conservative/aggressive
behavior noted in the previous section also emerges.
4 Optimal Harvesting Rules under Uncertainty: Risk vs Am-
biguity
4.1 Optimal Harvesting under Risk
In the previous section we analyzed harvesting rules which would seek to se-
cure SF and SMS for biodiversity preservation under alternative assumptions
regarding the structure of uncertainty. In this section we turn to the deriva-
tion of optimal harvesting rules under alternative uncertainty structures. In
particular we study the impact of model uncertainty and uncertainty, or ambi-
guity, aversion on optimal harvesting rules and we try to quantify precaution,
measured as the deviation between optimal harvesting rules under uncertainty
aversion relative to traditional risk aversion.
In the two species model, we consider the problem of choosing harvesting
paths for a xed land allocation w = (w; 1 w) which will maximize expected
discounted benets dened as:
max
fh1(t);h2(t)g
E0
Z T
0
e t
24X
i=1;2

ihi   1
2
ih
2
i

+
X
i=1;2

iui  
1
2
iu
2
i
35 dt
(31)
subject to
du1 = u1 (1  u1   a12u2   h1) dt+ 1(h)dz1
du2 = f^ (w)u2 (1  u2   a21u1   h2) dt+ 2(h)dz2:
It should be noted that the objective function includes both consumptive
benets assosiated with harvesting and non-consumptive benets, like exis-
tence values, assosiated with the levels of existing biomasses. Thus problem
(31) can be regarded as the regulators or the biodiversity managers prob-
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lem. For i = i = 0 the problem can be associated with a private agent who
does not attach any welfare weights to existing biomass but cares only about
consumptive benets.
We start by analyzing rst the deterministic solution, which will be used
as a benchmark. In the deterministic case where i = 0 for i = 1; 2; the
current value Hamiltonian function is dened as:
G= J + p1F
1 + p2F
2 (32)
with
J =
X
i=1;2

ihi   1
2
ih
2
i

+
X
i=1;2

iui  
1
2
iu
2
i

F 1= u1 (1  u1   a12u2   h1)
F 2= f^ (w)u2 (1  u2   a21u1   h2) :
Pontryagins maximum principle implies the following set of optimality
conditions:
ai   ihi   pifiui = 0 ; i = 1; 2 ; f1 = 1; f2 = f^ (w) (33)
1   1u1 +
:
p1 + p1 + p1f1(1  u1   a12u2   h1)  p1f1u1   p2f2u2a21 = 0
(34)
2   2u2 +
:
p2 + p2 + p2f2(1  u2   a21u1   h2)  p2f2u2   p1f1u1a12 = 0
(35)
f1u1(1  u1   a12u2   h1)  u1 = 0 (36)
f2u2(1  u2   a21u1   h2)  u2 = 0: (37)
The optimal deterministic short-run harvesting rules are obtained by solv-
ing (33), for hi , i = 1; 2 as:
hi =
ai   pifiui
i
: (38)
Substituting (38) into (34)-(37) we obtain the modied Hamiltonian dynamic
system. The steady state of this system determines the optimal long-run
equilibrium for biomasses. An optimal steady state with preservation of both
species is characterized by u = (u1; u2) > (0; 0). Assume that such a steady
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state exists. Using (36)-(37), we can solve for
ui =
(1  1f1   a11 )(1 
p2f2
2
)  aij(1  1f2   a22 )Q
i=1;2(1  pifiai )  a12a21
i = 1; 2: (39)
Substituting (39) into (34)-(35), we can solve for the steady state costate
vector p = (p1; p2) and in the sequence using (39),(38) we can obtain the
optimal steady state harvesting h = (h1; h2).
Assume that the modied Hamiltonian dynamic system (34)-(37) has a
steady state solution (u1; u2; p1; p2) which is a local saddle point, and let
(;;) = (u  u;h  h;p p); with u = (u1;u2);h = (h1; h2);p =
(p1;p2) denote deviations from the steady state.
To obtain tractable and interpretable results for the stochastic case, we
use Magills (1977) method for replacing a nonlinear stochastic optimal con-
trol problem by its linear-quadratic approximation around the deterministic
steady state.
Taking a rst order linear approximation of the stochastic di¤erential
equations given by (7) around the optimal deterministic steady state (u;h;p)
and following Magill (1977) problem (31) is replaced by:
max

E(0)
Z +1
0
e tL0(; )dt (40)
subject to
d1 = (
11
 1 + 
12
 2 +M
1
1)dt+ 1dz1
d2 = (
22
 1 + 
21
 2 +M
2
2)dt+ 2dz2; or
d = (+M)dt+dz; (41)
 =
"
1
2
#
; =
"
11 12
21 22
#
; =
"
1 0
0 2
#
; =
"
1
2
#
M1 = f1u

1;M
2
 =  f2u2;M =
"
M1 0
0 M2
#
; dz =
"
dz1
dz2
#
:
with 11 = f1 (1  2u1   a12u2   h1) ;12 =  f1a12u1; 1 = 1(h)
22 = f2 (1  2u2   a21u1   h2) ;21 =  f2a21u2; 2 = 2(h)
where
L0(;) =
1
2
"


#0 "
A N
N 0 B
#"


#
(42)
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with
"
A N
N 0 B
#
= f
"
Juu(u
; h) Juh(u; h)
Jhu(u
; h) Jhh(u; h)
#
+ (43)
X
i=1;2
pi
"
F iuu(u
; h)F iuh(u
; h)
F ihu(u
; h) F ihh(u
; h)
#
g:
In this case the Hamilton-Jacobi-Belman (HJB) equation implies, for the value
function V , that:16
V =max


L0(;) + V(+M) +
1
2
trace(T@2V )

(44)
where; V =
h
V1 V2
i
; @2V =
"
V11 V12
V21 V22
#
:
Since problem (40) is a linear quadratic problem, the value function should
be linear quadratic as well, of the form:
V (; t) =
1
2

0
Q+ r:
Then the maximizer  satises the folowing relationship:
 =  B 1(M 0Q0 +N 0): (45)
Substituting this value in (44) we obtain after manipulations that:
r =
1
2
trace(0Q0):
Matrix Q can be detrmined by the following matrix equation
1
2
(NB 1N 0 +A) =  1
2
N(B 1   (B 1)0)M 0Q0+ (46)
Q(   I
2
 MB 1N 0) +QM(1
2
(B 1)0  B 1)M 0Q:
After the determination of matrix Q; the optimal harvesting rule  can be
obtained from (45):
16We use either the notation T or 0; to denote the transpose of a matrix.
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4.2 Optimal Harvesting under Uncertainty: A Robust Con-
trol Approach
Following Hansen and Sargent (2001), problem (40) can be regarded as a
benchmark model. If the decision maker was sure about the benchmark
model, then there would be no concerns regarding scientic uncertainty and
model misspecication. In such a case the solutions derived in the previous
section would have been adequate for characterizing the optimal harvesting
rule. If however there are concerns about model uncertainty, the decision mak-
ing framework needs to account for uncertainty or ambiguity aversion. Model
uncertainty in this case is modelled by a family of stochastic perturbations,
so that:
zi(t) = z^i(t) +
Z t
0
!i(s)ds ; i = 1; 2 (47)
where fz^i(t) : t  0g are Brownian motions and f!i(t) : t  0g are measurable
drift distortions.
Consider again the rst-order linear approximation around the optimal
deterministic stationary state (u;h;p). Then the dynamics of our system
take the form:17
d1= [f1 (1  2u1   a12u2   h1)1   f1a12u112   f1u11 + !11] dt+(48)
1dbz1
d2= [f2 (1  2u2   a21u1   h2)2   f2a21u21   f2u22
+!12 + !2
p
1  22
i
dt+ 2dbz1 +p1  22dbz2.
Under model misspecication, a multiplier robust control problem (Hansen
et al., 2002) can be associated with the problem of maximizing discounted
benets under model uncertainty. This problem can be written in the linear
quadratic approximation form as:
V (1;2;u1; u2) =max
hi
min
!i
E0
Z 1
0
e tJrobustdt ; Jrobust =
24L0(;) + X
i=1;2
i
!2i
2
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subject to (48). (49)
In this optimization problem Nature acts as a mean agent seeking to
17Using the correlation coe¢ cient matrix R as in equation (22), we obtain independent
distorted Brownian motions.
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choosethe worst possible distortion. Thus the managers obgective is max-
imin: Choose the harvesting rule which maximizes discounted net benets
by taking into account the fact that the benchmark model could be misspec-
ied and biomass growth might be far less than the one suggested by the
benchmark model.Using matrix notation the problem can be written as:
max

min
$
E
Z +1
0
e tJrobustdt (50)
subject to
d = (+M +
$)dt+
dz^; with dz^ =
"
dz^1
dz^2
#
;
 =
"
1 0
2
p
1  22
#
 =
"
11 12
21 22
#
;M1 =  f1u1;M2 =  f2u2;M =
"
M1 0
0 M2
#
;$ =
"
!1
!2
#
11 = f1 (1  2u1   a12u2   h1) ;12 =  f1a12u1; 1 = 1(h)
22 = f2 (1  2u2   a21u1   h2) ;21 =  f2a21u2; 2 = 2(h):
In the above problem i for i = 1; 2 denotes the robustness parameters
which reects the intensity of concerns about model misspecication for the
biomasses dynamics. A value of i = 1 indicates the manager is condent
about the benchmark model and he/she is not concerned about possible model
misspecication, with no preference for robustness. This case can be regarded
as the traditional risk aversion case. A value of i = 0 indicates that there is
no knowledge about the initial model.
Using the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) regarding the existence
of a recursive solution to the multiplier problem, Hansen et al. (2002) show
that problem (50) can be transformed into a stochastic innite horizon two-
player game between the biodiversity manager and Nature. Nature plays the
role of a mean agent" and chooses a reduction $ in the mean return of
biomasses to reduce the agents revenue function.
The Bellman-Isaacs condition for this game implies that the value function
V satises the following equation:
V = max

min
$

Jrobust + @V (+M +
$) +
1
2
trace(
T

@2V 
)

(51)
@V =
h
V 1 V 2
i
; @2V =
"
V11 V12
V21 V22
#
:
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As in the risk aversion case examined in the previous section, the value func-
tion should be quadratic of the form:
V () =
1
2

0
Q+ r:
Solving initially for $; the distortion chosen by Nature, and taking into
account the expression of Jrobust; we obtain:
  1
0

Q0 =$; with  1 =
"
1
1
0
0 12
#
:18 (52)
Optimal harvesting is determined by the the maximizer of (51); which is:
U =  B 1(M 0Q0 +N 0): (53)
Substituting the values of (53),(52) into (51); we can initially determine r;Q
through the relationships
1
2
(NB 1N 0 +A) =  1
2
N(B 1   (B 1)0)M 0Q0+ (54)
Q(   I
2
 MB 1N 0) +QM(1
2
(B 1)0  B 1)M 0Q0   1
2
Q(

 1
0

)Q;
r =
1
2
trace(
0

Q0
): (55)
Then using (53), we can solve for optimal harvesting U :
4.3 Quantifying the Precautionary Principle
Relationships (45), (46) and (53), (54) characterize optimal harvesting under
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion respectively. The impact of the change in
the structure of uncertainty, from a single prior to multi priors, is embodied in
matrix Q determined by (46) for the risk aversion case and (54) for the ambi-
guity aversion case. Comparing relationships (46) and (54); it can be seen that
in (54); relative to (46); there is only one extra term,  12Q(
 1
0)Q0:This
term quanties the concerns about model uncertainty and indicates a di¤er-
ent harvesting rule relative to the one suggested under the risk aversion case.
It can therefore be regarded as reecting precaution. This extra term can be
18 1
2
$0  $=
P
i=1;2 i
!2i
2
:
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written as:
Z =  1
2
Q(

 1
0

)Q0 =  1
2
Q
"
21
1
12
1
12
1
(1 2)22
2
#
Q0: (56)
Depending on 

 1
0

; that is, on the magnitude of the parameters
i; ; i; through (56) the elements of the matrix Q in the robust control
(ambiguity aversion) case will have di¤erent values, and will indicate a di¤er-
ent harvesting rule than the rule emerging from standard risk aversion case.
It is clear that if i ! 1; i = 1; 2; that is there is no concern for model
uncertainty, Z = 0; and the optimal harvesting rules under risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion coincide. In this case precaution vanishes and only adjust-
ments for traditional risk (measurable uncertainty) a¤ect the decision rule.
Thus for nite i we have
PR = k   Uk 6= 0:
This deviation can be regarded as the quantication of precaution, since it
measures the deviations between optimal harvesting rules under risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion.19
5 Concluding Remarks
We introduce the conceptual frameworks of multiple priors in order to an-
alyze unmeasurable Knightian uncertainty (or ambiguity) which, given the
multiple types of uncertainty characterizing ecosystems, might be regarded
as a more appropriate framework relative to the classic risk case (measurable
uncertainty). We believe that this approach can be regarded as a formal way
of modelling the precautionary principle and providing policy rules for bio-
diversity management under model uncertainty and precaution. We specify
the multiple priors framework using the k -ignorance and the robust control
approaches, which are associated with decision making under uncertainty or
ambiguity aversion, in the context of least favorable priors and maxmin cri-
teria.
First, we apply the k -ignorance approach to a descriptive non-optimizing
dynamic model of interacting species and we provide safety standards through
land allocation and harvesting rules which could guarantee that species will
19A similar result can be obtained if we choose optimal harvesting by using the multiple
prior structure implied by k-ignorance, with the worst case perturbation dened as "it =
 p2 iui:
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not become extinct under scientic uncertainty and ambiguity. We solve the
problem both under risk aversion and under uncertainty or ambiguity aver-
sion and, by comparing solutions, we provide a measure of the impact from
adopting a precautionary approach. By considering a simplied linearized
version of the general model, we obtain numerical results which conrm and
quantify our theoretical ndings and we show that the cost of being precau-
tious can be quantied in terms of reduced harvesting. Rules could indicate,
depending on the type of species interactions, conservative behavior towards
one group of species and aggressive towards another. Furthermore, we pro-
vide land allocation and harvesting rules for keeping biomasses above some
minimum safety level with a given probability.
Second we consider an optimizing framework where robust control meth-
ods are used to specify multiple priors approaches and maxmin optimal har-
vesting rules. We compare solutions under risk and under uncertainty aversion
and show how a measure of precaution can be formulated.
It should also be noted that the impact of ambiguity depends on the sub-
jective parameters,  for k -ignorance and  for robust control, which represent
the managers beliefs regarding possible deviations from the reference model
and the structure of least favorable priors. Although these parameters are
subjective, their e¤ects can be traced by considering a set of solutions for
di¤erent values of these parameters, since land allocation or harvesting rules
are a function of either  or ; depending on the case. For  = 0 or  = 1;
rules under ambiguity are the same as rules under tradional risk aversion and
incentives for precautionary behavior vanish.
Our conceptual framework can be extended along two possible lines. The
conceptual framework of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity can be extended
to formal prey-predator or mechanistic resource-based models of species com-
petition, along with numerical simulation to obtain a sense of the quantita-
tive results. Finally, it might be worth exploiting the possibility of combined
presence of measurable (risk) and unmeasurable (ambiguity) uncertainty in
models described by two qualitatively di¤erent but interrelated dynamic sys-
tems. These could be, for example, coevolutionary models where population
dynamics which evolve in a fast time scale are characterized by measurable
uncertainty and a single prior, while trait dynamics which evolve in slow time
are characterized by unmeasurable uncertainly and multiple priors.
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